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I. European Commission
communications complementing
the Almunia Package
The last year has seen the initial stages of the operation of
the Almunia Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI)
Package1 to regulate compensation for SGEI. The Package,
it will be recalled, is part of a wider set of measures to mod-
ernise the European Commission’s Single Market ‘Europe
2020’ programme.2 The proposed measures to modernise
the procurement rules have not materialised in as coherent
a form as the State aid rules and yet it is clear from the
European Commission’s Staff Working Paper3 and discus-
sions of the marketisation of social services that the pro-
curement and State aid rules are closely inter-related.4
The Decision (Article 5(7))5 and the Framework
(paras 36 and 38)6 refer to swap rates in the context of
reasonable profit of the SGEI framework and the Euro-
pean Commission added to the initial Almunia Package
with an announcement on the Europa web pages,
of what the European Commission terms, an online
‘instrument’ to determine swap rate proxies which are
valid from 1 July 2013 to 31 December 2013.7
* Littleton Chambers, Temple, UK and SLS, University of Sussex.
1 Communication from the Commission on the application of the European
Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services
of general economic interest, OJ 2012 C8/4; Commission Decision of 20
December on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public
service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the
operation of services of general economic interest OJ 2012, L7 p.3;
Communication from the Commission, European Union framework for
State aid in the form of public service compensation OJ 2012 C8/15;
Commission Regulation on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid
granted to undertakings providing services of general economic interest, OJ
2012, L 114 p.8. See Erika Szyszczak and Johan van de Gronden (eds),
Financing Services of General Economic Interest: Reform and Modernization
(TMC Asser Press, 2012).
2 Initiated from the Monti Report, A New Strategy for the Single Market,
2010. Available at: ,http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/
monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf. accessed 13 September 2013.
3 European Commission, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2.
4 European Commission Reform Proposals available at: ,http://ec.europa.
eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/modernising_rules/
reform_proposals/index_en.htm. accessed 13 September 2013.
5 Article 5 (7) of the Commission Decision states: ‘For the purposes of this
Decision, a rate of return on capital that does not exceed the relevant swap
rate plus a premium of 100 basis points shall be regarded as reasonable in any
event. The relevant swap rate shall be the swap rate the maturity and currency
of which correspond to the duration and currency of the entrustment act.
Where the provision of the service of general economic interest is not connected
with a substantial commercial or contractual risk, in particular when the net
cost incurred in providing the service of general economic interest is essentially
compensated ex post in full, the reasonable profit may not exceed the relevant
swap rate plus a premium of 100 basis points’.
6 Para. 36 of the Framework states: ‘A rate of return on capital that does not
exceed the relevant swap rate plus a premium of 100 basis points is regarded
as reasonable in any event. The relevant swap rate is the swap rate whose
maturity and currency correspond to the duration and currency of the
entrustment act’. Para. 38 of the Framework states: ‘Where the provision of
the SGEI is not connected with a substantial commercial or contractual risk,
for instance because the net cost incurred in providing the service of general
economic interest is essentially compensated ex post in full, the reasonable
profit may not exceed the level that corresponds to the level specified in
paragraph 36. Such a compensation mechanism provides no efficiency
incentives for the public service provider. Hence its use is strictly limited to
cases where the Member State is able to justify that it is not feasible or
appropriate to take into account productive efficiency and to have a contract
design which gives incentives to achieve efficiency gains.’
7 ,http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/swap_rates_en.
html. accessed 13 September 2013.
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Key Points
† The last year has been a typical year in this survey of Services
of General Economic Interest (SGEI) and state measures
affecting competition where the report is a series of ad hoc
measures relating to SGEI.
† Two new soft communications have been published to com-
plement the Almunia Package of measures to regulate com-
pensation for SGEI: a European Commission instrument
to determine swap rates and a Commission Staff Working
Paper.
† There are a few European Commission Decisions, particularly
in the postal sector, involving financing SGEI that fall outside
of the new Almunia Package, but are assessed according to
the new methodological approach.
† The General Court (GC) has asked the European Commis-
sion to take greater care to analyse the funding of ancillary
services to health care schemes; a rebuke that is also seen in
applying Article 106 TFEU in the Greek Lignite case.
† Of a wider significance for European Union (EU) economic law,
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the European Com-
mission have provided analysis of the definition of ‘economic
activity’ which triggers the application of EU law generally.
† Two cases have considered the application of Article 106
TFEU, with the GC providing greater analysis of when, and
how, Articles 106 and 102 TFEU may be used together.
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Another communication from the European Commis-
sion adds to the growing body of ‘soft law’ which crystallises
the central role for the European Commission in the explan-
ation of how the free movement, procurement, and compe-
tition rules apply to SGEI.8 On 29 April 2013 the European
Commission published a revised and updated version of the
Commission Staff Working Document Guide to the applica-
tion of the European Union rules on state aid, public procure-
ment and the internal market to services of general economic
interest, and in particular to social services of general interest.9
This document is some 110 pages in length10 and contrasts
with the brief Frequently Asked Questions communications
from earlier years.11 It is a Handbook, outlining the new
legal framework and how it interacts with other areas of
European Union (EU) law, particularly procurement and
the Services Directive.12 This raises the question of its legal
status and how much reliance could be placed on the Staff
Working Document in litigation. Increasingly local and re-
gional administrations are being asked to apply EU compe-
tition law as a result of de-centralisation and the use of de
minimis rules and safe havens to free up the European Com-
mission’s workload. While the trigger for EU law to apply
exempts smaller and local forms of State aid for SGEI, there
is a debate over how much central guidance from either the
European Commission or the European Courts should
be available for local competition authorities to apply EU
competition law.13 One case study relating to healthcare in
the Netherlands suggests that, in the absence of EU guidance
in the form of Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)/General
Court (GC) case law, the local competition authority is
forging a national response of applying EU law and princi-
ples rather than wielding an autonomous national applica-
tion of competition law.14
II. European Commission Decisions and
the General Court on compensation for
SGEI
The first year of operation of the Almunia Package, the
European Commission’s modernisation of the Altmark
Package, has generated few Decisions from the European
Commission. This could indicate that the Member
States are fine tuning financial support to fall within the
new framework. This in turn frees up the European
Commission to undertake a closer investigation of the
more problematic cases, and several cases under review
here are investigations of older forms of State aid.
Of significance are three Decisions relating to finance
of the postal sector undergoing the next stages of
opening up the liberalisation of the postal market and
ensuring the viability of universal service obligations
(uso). The European Commission authorised two
tranches of compensation received by Poste Italiane for
delivering two uso in the period 2009–2011. The mea-
sures had not been notified to the European Commis-
sion until June 2012. Because the two measures had not
been notified before their implementation they consti-
tuted State aid. However, the European Commission was
willing to assess the measures in the light of the new
Almunia Package for compensation of SGEI. The first
measure concerned compensation of E1.1 billion for the
universal postal service and the second measure covered
the same period and was compensation of E458 million
for reduced postal tariffs offered to publishers, not-for-
profit organisations, and electoral candidates. The Euro-
pean Commission found the measures were compatible
with EU rules on public service compensation because
they did not overcompensate Poste Italiane for providing
these services, and therefore did not lead to cross-
subsidisation of commercial activities.
A review of the continuation of compensation to the
postal sector in the UK took place under an application
under Article 108 TFEU by the UK government.15 The
European Commission found the scheme to be compat-
ible with Article 106(2) TFEU. This was the first Deci-
sion using the Almunia Package as a framework for a
case that did not fall within the Altmark criteria. The
Post Office was granted two forms of aid: a loan to cover
its working capital and a grant to cover the deficit
between the costs and revenue of the postal network.
8 Erika Szyszczak, ‘Soft Law and Safe Havens’ in Ulla Neergaard et al. (eds),
Social Services in the EU (TMC Asser Press, 2012).
9 European Commission, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2.
10 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Guide to the application of the
European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the internal
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social
services of general interest’, SEC(2010) 1545 final, Brussels. This Guide
comprised 84 pages.
11 Cf the first Press Release: IP/04/235, Brussels, 18 February 2004,
Commission proposes new rules to increase legal certainty for services of
general economic interest.
12 Directive 2006/123, OJ 2006 L 376 p.36.
13 Christopher Townley, ‘Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions
for EU Competition Law (and for EU Law too)’ (26 July 2013) SSRN
paper, Available at: ,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2298588. accessed 13 September 2013.
14 Johan van de Gronden and Erika Szyszczak, ‘Introducing Competition
Principles into Health Care through EU Law and Policy: A Case Study of
the Netherlands’ (27 June 2013) Paper presented to School of Law,
University of Sheffield Health Law and Policy Research Group Inaugural
Workshop: Old Markets, New Markets: Health Law After the 2012 Act.
15 SA.33054 Compensation for net costs incurred to keep a non-commercially
viable network for the period 2012–15 and the continuation of a working
capital facility, OJ 2012 C 121. In previous decisions, the Commission had
authorised comparable financing measures for the Post Office Ltd (see
Press Release IP/07/288 (available at: ,http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-07-288_en.htm. accessed 13 September 2013) and SA.31156
(N508/2010), Press Release IP/11/346 (available at: ,http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-11-346_en.htm.) accessed 13 September 2013.
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The European Commission authorised UK plans to
grant E1383 million as a network subsidy to the UK
Post Office Ltd. The purpose of the aid was to maintain
and modernise non-commercially viable post offices,
especially in rural areas. The European Commission
found the measure did not exceed the net cost for pro-
viding the public service obligations (pso) entrusted to
the Post Office Ltd. The European Commission also
endorsed the continuation, under stricter conditions, of
a working capital facility of up to E1377 million which
provides the Post Office Ltd with sufficient liquidity to
carry out its pso, because this facility is provided on
market terms.
The Decision is of significance in relation to the
examination of procurement procedures and State aid.
The European Commission examined the fourth
Altmark criterion16 and para. 2 (6) of the Almunia
Package which requires competition between bids. The
entrustment of the pso to the Post Office used a nego-
tiated procedure. The European Commission decided
that this was not compatible with the fourth Altmark cri-
terion. The lack of a transparent and open, publicly
advertised procedure would not ensure that the nego-
tiated procedure would lead to the selection of the ten-
derer capable of providing the pso at the least cost to the
community.17 The UK government had not adduced any
evidence to show that the costs incurred by the Post
Office corresponded to the cost of a well-run undertak-
ing. Thus the European Commission found that there
was State aid. The European Commission was willing to
justify the State aid because the Post Office was the only
operator with a network and contractual relationships
that satisfied the requirements for the provision of the
SGEI. In these circumstances the European Commission
resorted to Article 31(1)(b) of Directive 2004/1818 which
justifies the use of a negotiated procedure in situations,
inter alia, where a public service contract, ‘. . . for
technical . . . or for reasons connected with the protec-
tion of exclusive rights, the contract may be awarded
only to a particular economic operator.’
The European Commission found that the entrust-
ment letter and funding agreement governing the
payment of the compensation contained appropriate
provisions to incentivise an efficient provision of the
public service, in line with the strategic plan of the
Post Office for the period 2012–2015 which aims at
modernising and improving the provision of services
over its network according to yearly efficiency
milestones.
In May 2013 the European Commission took a Deci-
sion to authorise finance of E300 million p.a. for a pso
in the Belgian postal sector operated by bpost for the
period 2013—2015. The calculation of the compensa-
tion complied with the new Almunia Package method-
ology and contained incentives to boost efficiency and
quality of postal services, without the possibility of
cross-subsidisation of commercial activities. The pso
comprised the distribution of newspapers and periodi-
cals, the home delivery of pensions, basic banking
services, and the maintenance of a widespread network.
In accordance with the Almunia Package, Belgium had
organised a public consultation which confirmed the
essential social and economic role of the pso entrusted
to bpost for Belgian citizens. On methodology, Belgium
committed to organise a competitive, transparent and
non-discriminatory tender for the delivery of newspa-
pers and periodicals in Belgium and will award a conces-
sion to the selected operator to take over the provision
of this service from 1 January 2016.
In a Decision in January 2012, the European Com-
mission had approved a pension relief of E3800
million for bpost, but ordered Belgium to recover
E417 million of incompatible aid from bpost, resulting
from overcompensations for its pso in the period
1992–2010.19 The May 2013 Decision was based upon
Belgium’s commitment to promptly recover the previ-
ous overcompensation.
The maritime sector has attracted investigations by
the European Commission. In June 2012 the European
Commission opened an investigation into aid received
by SNCM and CMN to operate transport links between
Corsica and Marseille.20 The Decision sheds light on the
question of the definition of an SGEI. France argued that
there was a pso in providing a basic service of permanent
passenger and freight transport and the additional
service of a passenger service for peak traffic during
holiday periods and the summer vacation season. France
was asked to explain why there was a public need for
16 The fourth criterion is: ‘Where the undertaking which is to discharge pso in a
specific case, is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which
would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services
at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be
determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical
undertaking, well run and adequately provided with the necessary means,
would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the
relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
17 Para. 41.
18 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, OJ
2004 L 134 p 114.
19 IP/12/45 and Memo/12/38.
20 Commission Decision of 2 May 2013 on State aid SA.22843 (2012/C) (ex
2012/NN) implemented by France in favour of Socie´te´ Nationale Maritime
Corse-Me´diterrane´e (notified under document C(2013) 1926) (2013/435/
EU), OJ 2013, L220 p.20.
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such services and to show that the additional pso could
not be provided by the market.
The European Commission was concerned to show
that the selection procedure for the pso ensured effective
and sufficient competition so that the pso holder was
able to provide the pso at the least cost to the commu-
nity. The European Commission was also concerned
about transparency issues, whether the parameters of the
compensation was pre-determined objectively and in a
transparent manner. The initial request for information
also asked for the amount of compensation paid for the
pso in order to investigate if there was overcompensa-
tion. The European Commission found that the com-
pensation received by SNCM and CMN under the basic
service constituted State aid but it was compatible with
the internal market under Article 106(2) TFEU. In con-
trast the compensation received by SNCM for the add-
itional service provided under the pso contract for the
period from 1 July 2007 to 31 December 2013 was illegal
and France was ordered to recover the aid. The European
Commission found that there was a manifest error in de-
ciding that the Marseille–Bastia and Marseille–Ajaccio
lines were in need of a pso because the volume of traffic
showed that services could be provided on a competitive
basis, thus the use of a pso was neither necessary nor
proportionate:
that Member States may not impose specific public service
obligations for services that are already provided or can be
provided satisfactorily in conditions (price, objective quality
features, continuity and access to the service) that are com-
patible with the public interest, as defined by the State, by
companies operating under normal market conditions.21
The contract for the pso had been awarded using a nego-
tiated procedure. The European Commission found that
the fourth Altmark criterion was not satisfied. The con-
tract to SNCM was awarded following a negotiated
procedure. Here, in theory, there was the possibility of
competition between bids since one other bid had been
submitted in addition to the bid from SNCM. However,
the European Commission found that the alternative bid
was not able to offer a credible alternative to the SNCM
bid. It had not been evaluated according to the award
criteria but on the basis of one selection criterion: the
ability to operate from a certain date. This was made
even more restrictive in that there was a very short time-
frame of three weeks between the date of awarding the
pso to the start of the services. The European Commis-
sion found that SNCM had a significant competitive
advantage over the incumbent operator: it already had
ships adapted to the requirements of the specifications
of the pso. The procedure therefore did not satisfy the
fourth Altmark criterion and did not allow the Corsican
Transport Board to compare several offers and to select
the most economically advantageous bid to deliver
the pso.
On 5 October 2011 the European Commission noti-
fied Italy that it was opening a wide-ranging investiga-
tion into various forms of State aid granted to the
former Tirrenia group (which had been privatised).22
The investigation was extended in November 2012.23
One aspect of the investigation is the nature of the pso
granted to the companies of the former Tirrenia Group
for operating certain maritime routes.24 The European
Commission is concerned that the pso compensation
granted by Italy to the companies for operating certain
maritime routes could create an unfair economic advan-
tage over competitors. The European Commission had
received complaints concerning the prolongation of the
pso contracts after the expiry, in December 2008, of the
Conventions that governed the services, as well as
aspects of the privatisation process. One aspect of
inquiry will be whether the prolongation of public
service contracts beyond 2008 was carried out according
to the EU rules on SGEI.
A case where the European Commission found a
long-standing breach of the State aid rules is seen in the
German Disposal of Animal Carcasses Decision.25 This
was a complaint to the European Commission by Saria
Bio-Industries AG & Co KG of annual payments to the
Zweckverband Tierko¨rperbeseitigung (ZT), a special-
purpose association for animal carcase disposal, in
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis,
and Landkreis Limburg-Weilburg. The complainant had
also initiated legal proceedings in the national court
which had found that there was illegal State aid.
The complainant argued that the ZT could not
survive economically if its members did not cover the
annual losses of disposing of animal carcasses by paying
annual contributions. The ZT had a monopoly for the
disposal of internal animal material (and thus no com-
petition) and offered below-market prices on the open
market for external animal material. The ZT’s price
policy was only oriented towards maximising utilisation
at its plants, which had high spare capacity. Germany
21 Para. 166.
22 European Commission—IP/11/1157 05/10/2011.
23 OJ 2013 C 84 p.58.
24 See European Commission—IP/12/1184 07/11/2012.
25 Commission Decision of 25 April 2012 on State aid SA.25051 (C 19/10)
(ex NN 23/10) granted by Germany to the Zweckverband
Tierko¨rperbeseitigung in Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Rheingau-
Taunus-Kreis and Landkreis Limburg-Weilburg, OJ 2012, L236 p.1.
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argued that the aid was used to comply with EU rules
and to contain animal diseases, such as BSE, and to
fulfil environmental goals and therefore fell within the
concept of a SGEI.
The aid was granted before the Almunia Package
came into effect and the European Commission applied
paragraph 69 of SGEI Guidelines, that states that after 31
January 2012, the Guidelines must be applied to unlaw-
ful State aid. The European Commission found that
there was no entrustment of an SGEI, and that an SGEI
did not exist. Furthermore the European Commission
found that the second Altmark criterion26 was not met
for the period 1979–2009, and the third Altmark criter-
ion27 was not met for the entire period. Consequently
section 2.3 of the SGEI Guidelines (for the period 1979
to 2009) and section 2.8 (for the entire period) were not
met. Thus Germany was found to be in breach of Article
108(3) TFEU and a recovery order for the illegal State
aid issued.
In a Decision of 20 January 2013 the European Com-
mission found that public compensation to La Banque
Postale in France from 2009 to 2014, aiming to improve
banking accessibility for poorer segments of the popula-
tion was compatible with EU State aid rules.28 The com-
pensation for La Banque Postale was granted before the
adoption of the Almunia Package and thus the transi-
tional provisions of the new Package applied, with any
compensation granted after 2014 falling under the new
framework.
On 10 May 2007, the Commission opened proceed-
ings on the exclusive right of Cre´dit Mutuel, Caisses
d’Epargne, and La Banque Postale to distribute the
savings books ‘Livret A’ and ‘Livret Bleu’.29 On 1 January
2009, France decided to liberalise the distribution of the
‘Livret A’ allowing all banks to distribute it. The Euro-
pean Commission therefore closed its investigation.30 At
the same time France entrusted La Banque Postale with
an SGEI mission to improve banking accessibility in
France by creating additional obligations on its ‘Livret A’
funded by state compensation. La Banque Postale is
obliged to open, without a fee, a ‘Livret A’ for every
client who asks for such a savings account. Other exam-
ples of the SGEI obligation included certain free banking
services: free cash deposits and withdrawals, including
for very low amounts. The European Commission
accepted that a significant number of economically
disadvantaged people rely on the ‘Livret A’ of La Banque
Postale for access to basic banking payment services. The
European Commission found that the compensation
granted to La Banque Postale did not exceed the net cost
for discharging the pso but if overcompensation should
occur, a procedure was in place obliging La Banque
Postale to repay any excess compensation. The European
Commission also concluded that any distortions of com-
petition in the banking sector would be limited since the
‘Livret A’ of La Banque Postale was unlikely to affect
current accounts offered by the market, because it offers
only limited payment possibilities and therefore clients
of another bank would be unlikely to close a current
account to manage their payments and transactions
from a ‘Livret A’ of La Banque Postale.
The European Commission and the GC are taking a
stricter approach to the financing of healthcare schemes.
Healthcare is one of the areas in the Almunia Package
where special measures may be taken in the context of pro-
viding healthcare as an SGEI. However the complexity of
the mix of public and private provision of healthcare
requires close analysis to ensure that proper compensation
is awarded for providing an SGEI and that cross-subsidisa-
tion does not allow for the distortion of emerging com-
petitive markets. The European Commission proposed
measures for Ireland to abolish the unlimited state guaran-
tee enjoyed by the Voluntary Health Insurance Board
(VHI) by the end of 2013. The VHI was set up in 1957 by
the Voluntary Health Insurance Act as a statutory body,
with the aim of offering voluntary health insurance. By
virtue of this status, VHI cannot be forced into bankruptcy
and, as a consequence, it is able to obtain loans on prefer-
ential terms and its business partners need not be con-
cerned with VHI’s ability to perform its obligations, as its
credit or commercial risks are borne by the State. The rele-
vant provisions remained in place after the opening up to
competition of the Irish market for private medical insur-
ance in 1994. This, the European Commission argues, pro-
vides VHI with an undue advantage over its competitors.31
The GC has taken a strict approach to financing
health care in the CBI case.32 The issue concerned aid
given to public hospitals in Brussels. Belgium law creates
a framework to allow hospitals to be funded by the state
in order to provide particular medical services. Public
26 ‘The parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be
established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, to avoid it
conferring an economic advantage which may favour the recipient
undertaking over competing undertakings.’
27 ‘The compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the
costs incurred in the discharge of public service obligations, taking into
account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those
obligations.’
28 Service d’inte´reˆt e´conomique ge´ne´ral (SIEG) d’accessibilite´ bancaire du
Livret A de la banque postale, OJ 2013, C81/3
29 IP/07/641.
30 IP/09/1482.
31 European Commission—IP/12/844 25/07/2012.
32 Case T-137/10, Coo¨rdinatie van Brussels instellingen voor welzijnswerk en
gezondheidszorg (CBI), 7 November 2012, not yet reported.
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hospitals in Brussels were also granted aid for carrying
out particular social services, such as treating patients
who cannot afford medical treatment (‘social patients’).
The obligation to give assistance to social patients was
laid down in programmes drawn-up by the hospitals in
close cooperation with the public authorities. The State
aid measures were notified to the European Commis-
sion, which approved these measures.33 The European
Commission was of the opinion that the task to provide
medical services constitutes an SGEI, and this was set
out in Belgian legislation. The task to give assistance to
social patients was also an SGEI, given the involvement
of public authorities in creating the programmes. When
the European Commission examined whether the aid
measures were justified, it found that the fourth condi-
tion of Altmark34 was not met but the aid fell within the
scope of the European Commission Decision35 and there
was no overcompensation because over-payments were
adjusted.
The approval of the Belgian scheme covering the
social service element was challenged by a group of
Belgian private hospitals. The GC assessed whether the
public hospitals were entrusted with an SGEI mission. In
relation to the task to provide assistance to social
patients, the GC pointed to the general duty in Belgian
law, according to which every hospital is obliged to treat
persons in need. Consequently, it was questionable
whether giving assistance to social patients was the sole
responsibility of the public hospitals. On the issue of
avoiding overcompensation, the GC found that the con-
ditions for giving subsidies to the public hospitals were
unclear and left a wide margin of appreciation to the
public authorities involved. Overcompensation could
not be avoided, as no mechanisms for preventing over-
compensation were in place. Accordingly, the GC found
that the European Commission had failed to examine
properly whether problems of overcompensation
existed. Therefore, it annulled the European Commis-
sion Decision approving the social aid given to the
public hospitals in Brussels with an admonishment to
examine with greater care whether the aid given to these
hospitals is compatible with the EU rules for State aid.
III. Economic activity
When analysing the relationship between SGEI and
other state intervention in competitive markets, a crucial
legal tool is the concept of ‘economic activity’.36 The
boundary between economic and non-economic activity
has become even more significant as liberalisation and
cutbacks to the welfare state in Europe have created new
concepts of public services provided by state and non-
state actors and new hybrid bodies. It is acknowledged
that a body may be exercising public powers and not be
engaged in economic activity but also may offer goods
and services on a market and engage in economic activ-
ity, triggering the application of EU economic law.
At stake for the purposes of EU law is the question of
whether the public and economic activities can be sepa-
rated. The processes of liberalisation and marketisation
may have blurred the boundaries of EU law, but, at the
same time the Treaty of Lisbon 2009 has constitutionally
entrenched a boundary between economic and non-
economic activities in Article 14 TFEU where a distinc-
tion is made between SGEI and non-economic services of
general interest (NESGI). This distinction is reinforced
in Protocol No. 26 on Services of General Interest (SGI),
setting a means of dividing competences between the EU
and the Member States. Thus, it is of some interest and
significance to examine Commission Decisions and
CJEU rulings on the way in which this boundary is being
determined.
In Ordem dos Te´cnicos Oficiais de Contas (OTOC) v
Autoridade da Concorreˆncia (AdC)37 we see that where a
non-state regulatory body sets out professional rules
that directly determine the market and the opportunity
for access to the market in professional training, the
Court is not willing to exclude the activities from the ap-
plication of the competition rules or to create a wide
concept of public duties. The CJEU applied Wouters38
and held that there was no issue in finding that chartered
accountants carry out an economic activity and there-
fore the manner in which their profession is regulated
also relates to an economic activity. On the question of
whether OTOC, the regulatory body for chartered
accountants was exercising an economic activity, the
CJEU dismissed the idea that this was a public body
which could fall outside of the competition rules. It was
composed of members of the profession it regulated and
was a professional association where the appointment of
its members was unaffected by national authorities.
It was immaterial that OTOC was regulated by public
law. OTOC had a wide discretion on how to organise the
profession. Thus the impact of its rules relating to the
training of the profession of charted accountants in
Portugal could be scrutinised under EU competition law.
33 Commission Decision of 28 October 2009 in case NN 54/2009, Financing
the public hospitals of the IRIS network of Brussels, C(2009)8120 final.
34 See n16.
35 See n 1.
36 Case C-205/03 P FENIN v Commission [2006] ECR I-6295, para. 25.
37 Case C-1/12, judgment of 28 February 2013 (Second Chamber).
38 Case C-309/99 [2002] ECR I-1577.
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The perennial question of whether there should be
consistency across the EU Treaties and secondary legisla-
tion of core concepts invites a discussion of Finanzamt
Freistadt Rohrbach Urfahr v Unabha¨ngiger Finanzsenat
Außenstelle Linz, in the presence of: Thomas Fuchs.39 In a
very different context from competition law, the Court
has provided an interpretation of ‘economic activity’ in
a case concerning the recovery of VAT from an alterna-
tive energy supply provided by a domestic household. In
2005 Mr Fuchs had a photovoltaic installation fitted to
the roof of his home. The installation had no storage
capacity and allowed all of the electricity produced in
the home to be supplied to the electricity network. The
dispute arose when Mr Fuchs applied for the reimburse-
ment of the VAT on the purchase of the photovoltaic
installation. The Finanzamt decided that Mr Fuchs was
not entitled to the VAT rebate because he did not carry
out an economic activity: a criterion that was required
under the EU Sixth VAT Directive 77/388. The CJEU
held that a residential house could be used as a residen-
tial dwelling as well as performing economic activity. It
added that the scope of economic activities is very wide
and that the term is objective in nature without regard
to the purpose or results as to why it is carried out. The
Court went on to find that the installation of a photo-
voltaic device would fall within the concept of economic
activity if it was installed with the purpose of providing
an income on a continuing basis. The concept of income
was explained further as ‘consideration for the activity
carried out’.40 The Court held that it was not relevant
that the amount of electricity produced was always lower
than the amount of electricity consumed by Mr Fuchs.
This reinforces the functional approach towards the def-
inition of economic activity used by the CJEU in compe-
tition cases. It implies that even if there is no likelihood
that operating costs can be fully covered, or the possibil-
ity of making a profit, there is an economic activity
where income is generated. The result is a wide defin-
ition of economic activity.
The European Commission took a Decision as to
whether there was State aid relating to three sets of
Italian tax exemptions for non-commercial entities per-
forming specific activities (IMU), or providing social
assistance, welfare, health, cultural, educational or recre-
ational activities (ICI), or exercising ecclesiastical or
amateur sporting club activities (TUIR).41
On the ICI exemptions, Italy argued that the tax
exemptions did not amount to State aid because the
bodies were not ‘undertakings’ but carried out duties
of a high social value and in the public interest.
However, the government had granted the exemptions
on a general basis without carrying out a detailed as-
sessment of the scope of economic and non-economic
activities as understood in EU law. The European Com-
mission challenged this classification drawing upon
established principles that the status of the body under
national law was not relevant, that the application of
the State aid rules is not dependent upon whether the
body is created to generate profit; not-for-profit bodies
can carry out an economic activity by offering goods
and services on a market; the classification of a body is
always relative to a specific activity. This is an import-
ant issue given the increased attempts by the state
across Europe to create new and hybrid bodies to
deliver social services.
The European Commission found that the alleged
‘non-undertaking’ characteristics put forward by Italy
were not present in all of the bodies under scrutiny.
Thus the European Commission decided that the ICI
measure was State aid. Surprisingly, the European Com-
mission took the view that the aid could not be recov-
ered because it was absolutely impossible to do so; there
were insufficient records separating the economic and
non-economic activities of the beneficiaries of the
exemption.
In contrast the European Commission found that that
IMU and TUIR measures were not an illegal form of State
aid. The beneficiaries of the IMU were not classified as
‘undertakings’ because they were not free to choose the
recipients of their services and were compelled to offer
their services for free (or at least for a symbolic fee) which
had no relationship to the cost of the service. In relation
to the TUIR measure, the Italian law defined the non-
commercial activities of the beneficiaries of the tax ex-
emption and it was possible to lose the exemption if other
commercial activities were undertaken.
In Compass-Datenbank GmbH v Republic Osterreich42
the question of an alleged abuse of a dominant position
by a public authority (the Firmenbuch) authorised to
collect data focused upon whether there was an ‘under-
taking’ carrying out ‘economic’ activity. However, the
CJEU appears to depart from its functional approach to
39 Case C-219/12, judgment of 20 June 2013. I am grateful to Phedon
Nicolaides for making me aware of this ruling: ‘The Flexible Boundary
between Economic and Non-economic Activities (part I)’ available at:
,http://www.lexxion.eu/training/stateaidblog/2013/07/29/51-the-flexible-
boundary-between-economic-and-non-economic-activities-part-i.
accessed 13 September 2013.
40 Para. 23.
41 Commission Decision 2013/84 on municipal real estate tax exemption
granted to real estate used by non-commercial entities for specific purposes
implemented by Italy, SA 20829, OJ 2013, L166 p 24.
42 Case C- 138/11, judgment of 12 July 2012.
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examining whether or not there is economic activity.
The Austrian government brought an action seeking,
inter alia, to prevent Compass-Datenbank from using
the Firmenbuch data, including storage, reproduction or
transmission of that data to third parties. Compass-
Datenbank required access to daily updates of extracts
from the Firmenbuch concerning entries or deletion of
information by undertakings. It provided information
services based on information contained in the
Firmenbuch, supplemented by information resulting
from searches carried out by Compass-Datenbank’s own
editorial services and by other information from Cham-
bers of Commerce.
The Court reiterates its case law on the nature of eco-
nomic activity and an ‘undertaking’, and, citing SELEX, 43
discusses the severability of economic activities from
public duties: if an economic activity could not be sepa-
rated from the exercise of its public powers, the activities
exercised by that entity as a whole remained activities
connected with the exercise of those public powers. Even
if the public duty involved payment of a fee, this would
not detract from the status of a public body in EU law.
Similarly in this instance the creation of intellectual prop-
erty rights to protect the stored data did not detract from
the public authority nature of the activity. Thus the Court
concluded that the Firmenbuch was acting as a public au-
thority and was not engaged in economic activity for the
purposes of EU law. The outcome from this case suggests
that if a public authority was charging disproportionate
fees, or preventing new services from emerging, it would
be difficult to apply competition rules to redress the
issues. The ruling was criticised by Sanchez-Graells:
In my view, this reasoning falls again in the defect (or mis-
leading argument) of pegging an activity that is clearly eco-
nomic (ie maintenance and exploitation of the database) to
a non-economic activity (creation of the database by man-
datory disclosure and reporting) and considering them
non-separable despite the fact that there is no technical or
economic hurdle to do so. It is quite telling that the CJEU
does not provide any reasons for the finding that the cre-
ation of the database and its ulterior economic exploitation
‘are activities which cannot be separated’.44
As Sanchez Graells points out, in other Member
States there are private companies successfully using the
databases created by public authorities (or Chambers of
Commerce) as a result of the mandatory disclosure and
reporting of corporate statements and accounts—and
there appears to be no clear technical or economic
barrier for this market not to flourish.
A similar kind of issue arose in two European Com-
mission Decisions. In a Decision involving an extension
of a support scheme for libraries in the Czech Republic45
to digitalise older publications to create wider on-line
access the European Commission cites the Compass
case.46 The European Commission states that: ‘one of
the main criteria for deciding whether a given activity is
economic in nature, [is] whether such activity may be
carried out at least in principle by a private enterprise
for profit. The activities of the libraries . . . would not
therefore be undertaken by any private entity seeking
profit.’47 Arguably, however, the heavy subsidisation by
the state of such projects would make competition
unworkable, alongside current demands for greater open
access of publishing.
The European Commission also states that the fact that
an amount up to the real cost of the service is paid by the
user for certain services is not relevant. Any remuneration
is not in itself sufficient for the activity carried out to be
an economic activity. It is the not-for-profit function and
the legal obligation to provide most services without
payment by the consumer that determined that there was
no economic activity to categorise the libraries as ‘under-
takings’ for the purposes of EU law.
The European Commission also refers to Compass-
Datenbank in a Decision relating to a national (German)
website for publicising auctions in insolvency proceed-
ings: the ZVG Portal.48 The portal was created and
financed by all of the German La¨nder. It facilitated the
publicity of compulsory auctions being carried out by
the lower courts involved in the insolvency proceeding.
The lower courts paid a nominal fee of E1 to publicise
the auction. A commercial undertaking had already
created a system for providing information on compul-
sory auctions in Germany and made a complaint to the
European Commission that the ZVG Portal was funded
by illegal State aid. At the heart of this discussion is the
question of whether the ZVG Portal was an exercise of
official authority.
The complaint was that the La¨nder had concluded an
agreement that was a voluntary market transaction, not
43 Case C-113/07P, SELEX Sistemi Integrati v Commission [2009] ECR I-2207.
44 ‘Another step back in the definition of (public) undertakings for the purposes
of EU competition law’, How To Crack a Nut Blog, 16 July 2012, available at:
,http://howtocrackanut.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/another-step-back-in-
definition-of.html. accessed 13 September 2013.
45 Notified to the European Commission in the interest of ‘legal security’.
46 SA.35529 (2012/N)—Czech Republic Digitization of books in libraries,
Brussels, 16 April 2013, C(2013) 1893 final.
47 Ibid., para. 24.
48 C(2013) 2361 final.
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an act of public authority. The European Commission
dismissed this complaint by finding that the La¨nder
worked under a voluntary agreement and there was no
compulsion to fund the ZVG Portal. The European Com-
mission then went on to state that ‘. . . generally speaking,
unless the member state concerned has decided to intro-
duce market mechanisms, activities that intrinsically
form part of the prerogatives of official authority and are
performed by the State do not constitute economic activ-
ities’.49 Referring to the Compass-Datenbank GmbH
ruling the European Commission states:
the mere fact that private operators are already offering the
service to publish certain information, when requested by
public authorities, does not mean that, if the State carries out
the same or similar activity, this activity automatically has to
be considered ‘economic’ in nature. This should be judged
rather on the kind of activity concerned, considering also the
context in which it takes place. The State does not forgo the
right to carry out a task, which is ‘public authority’ in nature,
by acting at a point in time when private operators—perhaps
due to a lack of action by the State—have already taken the
initiative to offer services to the same end.50
The European Commission held that publicising com-
pulsory auctions forms part of the prerogative of official
authority, is as such performed by the state, and does
not constitute, not even in part, an economic activity.
The nominal amount of E1 that was paid for the publi-
city by the lower courts was not sufficient to make the
activity economic. Thus, the Decision respects the
competence of the State to determine its public and
economic spheres of activity.
IV. Article 106 TFEU
After a long investigation, the Commission took an
unusual step,51 which attracted much critical comment
in its use of Article 106 TFEU and Article 102 TFEU, to
tackle an alleged abuse of a dominant position in the
Greek electricity market.52 The GC was given the oppor-
tunity to clarify the relationship between Article 102
TFEU and Article 106(1) in a detailed and analytical
judgment which casts greater light on how Article 106
TFEU should be used in combination with other Treaty
provisions. DEI, an electricity company, owned by a ma-
jority share holding by the Greek government was left as
an incumbent after the liberalisation of the Greek electri-
city market. DEI owned all of the Greek electricity power
stations that used lignite. The European Commission
alleged that DEI held a monopoly in the grant of rights
to exploit lignite in Greece and brought an infringement
action against Greece based upon the ‘inequality of
opportunity’ case law.53 This case law, with the exception
of France v Commission, has developed through prelim-
inary rulings, which lack the detailed factual investiga-
tion that is central to a European Commission Decision.
The European Commission’s interpretation of the
case law was that by using Article 106(1) TFEU in
combination with Article 102 TFEU, it did not need to
show a specific abuse of a dominant position had taken
place. The European Commission argued that the Greek
government, through DEI, had exclusive access to lignite
in Greece, providing an opportunity to use the lowest
cost method of running electricity power stations, giving
Greece an advantage over other operators in the liberal-
ised electricity market.
Contrary to the European Commission’s interpretation
of the factual situation the GC found that almost 50 per
cent of the Greek exploitable lignite resources were still
free for exploitation by third parties; that DEI enjoyed ex-
ploitation rights prior to the liberalisation of the electri-
city markets in Greece; that DEI sells electricity in the
downstream compulsory daily market for the wholesale
of electricity complying with the conditions determined
by the regulatory framework and the European Commis-
sion had never questioned the effectiveness of the regula-
tory framework. The GC went on to find that DEI was
unable to manipulate the downstream market merely by
exercising its lignite exploitation rights.
The GC analysed the legal and regulatory background
underpinning the case law on Articles 106(1) and 102
49 Ibid., para. 29.
50 Case 13/11, para. 32.
51 Cf. In the energy sector the European Commission conducted an inquiry
and published a Report in 2007: Commission Communication
COM(2006)851; Commission Staff Working Paper (SEC(2006)1724).
Subsequent follow up investigations of individual undertakings resulted in
the adoption of Article 9 Commitments: Distrigaz COMP/37966, 2007;
German Electricity Wholesale Market, COMP/30389; E.on, COMP/39.388,
2008; E.ON, COMP/39.317, 2010; GdF Suez, case COMP 39316, 2009;
RWE, COMP/39.402, 2009; EDF, Case COMP/39.386, 2010; ENI, Case
COMP/39.315, 2010; Swedish interconnectors Case COMP/39351, 2010.
Generally, the use of such commitments has become the practice in recent
Article 102 TFEU Decisions, see the Survey by E`ric Barbier de La Serre and
Eileen Lagathu, ‘The Law on Fines Imposed in EU Competition
Proceedings: Faster, Higher, Harsher’ (2013) 4:4 Journal of European
Competition Law & Practice 325.
52 The case is usually referred to as the Greek Lignite case: Case T-169/08 DEI
v Commission, judgment of 20 December 2012. The European
Commission’s case is put by Philippe Chauve and Polyvios Panayides ‘The
importance of access to fuels for competition in the electricity sector: the
case of lignite in Greece’ (2008) Competition Policy Newsletter, No 3, 37.
For discussion see the comments on the Chillin Competition blog: ‘Me´nage
a` trois: The General Court’s judgment in Case T-169/08 PPC v
Commission’, Available at: ,http://chillingcompetition.com/2012/11/20/
menage-a-trois-the-general-courts-judgment-in-case-t-16908-ppc-v-
commission/. accessed 13 September 2013.
53 Case C-163/96, Raso and Others [1998] ECR I-533 Case C-202/88, France v
Commission [1991] ECR I-1223; Case C-18/88, GB-Inno-BM [1991] ECR I-
5941; Case C-462/99, Connect Austria [2003] ECR I-5197.
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TFEU. The GC concluded that in the case law the CJEU
did not assess the state measures in a vacuum, but ana-
lysed the actual or potential abuse that could arise from
the state measures. Thus the GC ruled that the European
Commission must do more than establish that a state
measure leads to the creation of a situation of ‘inequality
of opportunity’; the European Commission must also
identify the actual or potential aspect of a state measure
that results in an abuse of a dominant position under
Article 102 TFEU.
The case of OTOC v AdC54 has been discussed in
Section III in relation to economic activity. This raised
the interaction of the free movement rules in Article 56
TFEU and the competition rules of Article 101 TFEU
and Article 106(2) TFEU and was referred to the CJEU
by the Tribunal da Relac¸a˜o de Lisboa (Court of Appeal,
Lisbon). This case also addressed the equality of oppor-
tunity principle. In OTOC v AdC the dispute concerned
a Training Regulation adopted in 2007 by the Chamber
of Chartered Accountants (succeeded by OTOC) to
regulate the compulsory training of chartered accoun-
tants. The Regulation distinguished institutional train-
ing and professional training and gave OTOC a
monopoly in the provision of institutional training. Two
training bodies had been refused accreditation of their
training courses and claimed that the 2007 Training
Regulation unduly restricted their freedom to provide
training for chartered accountants. The AdC found that
the Training Regulation infringed Articles 101 and 102
TFEU and imposed a fine on OTOC. On appeal
the lower Lisbon Commercial Court also found that the
Training Regulation distorted competition on the
market for compulsory training for chartered accoun-
tants and that the Training Regulation was likely to
hinder trade between the Member States. It rejected a
justification for the Regulation that restrictions on com-
petition were necessary in order to ensure the proper ex-
ercise of the profession of accountant. However, it also
held that there was no infringement of Article 102
TFEU. OTOC appealed this decision to the Lisbon
Court of Appeal, arguing that it held a public service
mission, derived directly from law, which consisted of
the promotion and contribution to training of chartered
accountants in Portugal. Thus, its training activities fell
outside of the scope of ‘economic activity’ and conse-
quently outside of the scope of Article 101 TFEU. Fur-
thermore, OTOC argued that the Wouters case applied:
any restrictive effects on the conduct of OTOC were jus-
tified by the need to ensure the proper exercise of the
profession of chartered accountants in Portugal. Add-
itionally OTOC put forward the argument that an ex-
emption derived from Article 101(3) TFEU applied: the
Training Regulation contributed to improving the provi-
sion, distribution, and promotion of technical or eco-
nomic progress, giving users a fair share of the benefit.
Finally, OTOC argued that the creation of a system of
compulsory training for chartered accountants was a
SGEI within the scope of Article 106(2) TFEU.
As discussed above, the CJEU found that OTOC was
carrying out an economic activity. The Court found
that the Training Regulation applied to the whole terri-
tory of Portugal and the effect of the rules was liable to
affect trade between the Member States. Article 56
TFEU was not relevant to the appeal brought under the
competition rules. The nature of the Training Regula-
tion would affect the decision to access the training
market in Portugal of a provider from another Member
State. Even though the aim of the Regulation was to
maintain quality of training and did not have an antic-
ompetitive objective, it was necessary to examine the
actual and potential effects of the Regulation on com-
petition in the internal market. The CJEU found that
the monopoly over institutional training gave OTOC a
significant part of the market of compulsory training
for chartered accountants but was also liable to give
OTOC a competitive advantage in the provision of
professional training. It was for the referring court to
examine the market and the conditions for access to the
market for bodies in competition with OTOC.
However, citing MOTOE,55 the Court made it clear that
the regulatory system controlled by OTOC made it very
difficult for competitors to enter the training market and
therefore the contested Regulation did not ensure equal-
ity of opportunity. While the Court accepted the aims of
the Regulation, to ensure the quality of training services
offered to chartered accountants, it was not convinced
that the restriction on competition was proportionate,
according to the Wouters’ criteria. The Regulation
resulted in the elimination of competition in a substan-
tial part of the internal market and the fixing of discrim-
inatory conditions on the other part of the market and
thus the restrictions went beyond what was necessary
to achieve the objective of the Training Regulation.
Furthermore the CJEU found the Regulation to not
satisfy the four cumulative conditions of Article 101(3)
TFEU since the Regulation was liable to make it possible
for OTOC to eliminate competition in a substantial part
of the market for the training services of chartered
accountants and the restrictions imposed were not to be
regarded as essential.
54 Case C-1/12, judgment of 28 February 2013. 55 Case C-49/07 ECR I-4863 [2008].
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The CJEU gave short shrift to the argument that
OTOC was entrusted with an SGEI. It did not conduct a
detailed assessment of whether the Regulation and
supply of training services was capable of being an SGEI.
Instead it stated that it had received no evidence that the
services provided by OTOC exhibited special character-
istics as compared with other economic activities, or that
the application of the competition rules of the Treaty
would obstruct the performance of an SGEI task. In any
event, from the discussion of the application of Article
101 TFEU, the Court had found that the restrictions on
competition went beyond what was necessary to ensure
the performance of the particular tasks assigned to
OTOC, and therefore Article 106(2) TFEU would not
apply. The sharp dismissal of the SGEI argument leads us
not to dwell too much on the theoretical methodology of
the relationship between SGEI and competition rules con-
tained in Article 101 TFEU. Article 106(2) has been
applied in different ways by the European Courts,56 but is
conventionally viewed as a derogation from the funda-
mental competition and free movement rules of the
Treaty and should be interpreted restrictively and the
principle of proportionality applied. In contrast, Article
101(3) TFEU is an exemption from the competition rules
and applies in a more technical manner.
doi:10.1093/jeclap/lpt067
56 An analysis can be found in the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in
Joined Cases C-67/96, C-115-17/97, and C-219/97, Albany Int BV v
Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR 1–5751.
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013, Vol. 4, No. 6524 SURVEY
 at U
niversity of Sussex on June 9, 2014
http://jeclap.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
